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ABSTRACT 
This Article forms part of the proceedings of the 10th Annual Berle 
Symposium (2018), which focused on Adolf Berle and the world he 
influenced. He and Gardiner Means documented in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (1932) what they said was a separation 
of ownership and control in major American business enterprises. Berle 
and Means became sufficiently closely associated with the separation of 
ownership and control pattern for the large American public firm to be 
christened subsequently the “Berle–Means corporation.” This Article 
focuses on the “rise” of the Berle–Means corporation, considering in so 
doing why ownership became divorced from control in most of America’s 
biggest companies. It also assesses whether developments concerning 
institutional investors and shareholder activism have precipitated the “fall” 
of the Berle–Means corporation, in the sense that U.S. corporate 
governance is no longer characterized by a separation of ownership and 
control. 
INTRODUCTION 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means maintained in 1932 in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property that “in the largest American 
corporations, a new condition has developed. . . . [T]here are no dominant 
owners, and control is maintained in large measure apart from 
ownership.”1 This claim that ownership in large firms had separated from 
control would have an enduring legacy. Economists James Hawley and 
Andrew Williams suggested in 2000 “[t]he phenomenon Berle and Means 
identified in 1932—the divorce of ownership and control—would come to 
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dominate most thinking about issues of corporate governance for the rest 
of the twentieth century.”2 Indeed, in 1991, law professor Mark Roe 
coined the term “Berle–Means corporation” to refer to a large public firm 
with fragmented share ownership.3 This shorthand (sometimes changed 
slightly to “Berle and Means corporation”) has been adopted with some 
regularity since.4 
This Article examines the rise and possible fall of the Berle–Means 
corporation. With respect to the rise, one might think that nearly nine 
decades after the publication of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property the reasons why the separation of ownership and control which 
Berle and Means documented occurred would be well known. Plausible 
causes have indeed been identified, but debate continues.5 This Article 
does not provide a definitive explanation for the separation of ownership 
and control in large American firms. Doing so may be impossible since 
multiple factors contributed to the rise of the Berle–Means corporation. 
With respect to the rise of the Berle–Means corporation, this Article 
moves the debate about causes forward in two ways. First, an analytical 
framework will be provided that clarifies the factors at work. Second, an 
important voice will be added to the discussion, namely Adolf Berle’s. He 
speculated on various occasions on developments that likely contributed 
to the separation of ownership and control that he and co-author Gardiner 
Means sought to document. Berle’s conjectures provide intriguing insights 
into why the Berle–Means corporation moved to the forefront of American 
corporate governance. 
Given that Mark Roe conceived of the expression “Berle–Means 
corporation” in the early 1990s and given that the shorthand caught on 
thereafter, it might be assumed that a separation of ownership and control 
remains well-ensconced in the American corporate governance firmament. 
In fact, doubts have been cast recently on the continued relevance of Berle 
and Means’s description of the typical large public company. For instance, 
in 2013, corporate law scholars Ronald Gilson and Jeff Gordon argued 
“[t]he Berle–Means premise of dispersed share ownership is now wrong.”6 
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Thus, the Berle–Means corporation could be falling away as a symbol of 
American corporate governance arrangements, if it has not fallen already. 
This Article argues that it is premature to write off the Berle–Means 
corporation. The Berle–Means analysis of the public company, duly 
amended to reflect the growing prominence of institutional shareholders, 
remains relevant.7 When Berle and Means wrote, aside from those 
stockholders who were vested with sufficient voting power to count on 
prevailing when resolutions were put forward, the shareholder base of 
public companies was comprised largely of individuals with tiny stakes 
who had neither the aptitude nor the inclination to intervene in corporate 
affairs. Today, with institutional investors holding the bulk of public 
company shares, this sort of wholesale diffusion of share ownership and 
an associated intrinsic bias in favor of passivity are now absent. The 
collective ownership stakes of leading institutional shareholders are now 
substantial enough to mean, theoretically, they can readily collaborate and 
put executives running large companies squarely on the back foot, a 
prospect foreign to the dispersed individual shareholders prevalent when 
Berle and Means wrote. 
While the rise of institutional investors has changed governance 
dynamics in large American public companies, passivity remains the 
default position for today’s shareholders. This pattern, moreover, is being 
reinforced by the rapidly growing popularity of funds the mandate of 
which is to buy and sell shares to match the performance of well-known 
stock market indices. The business model of these “index trackers,” 
oriented around simplicity and cost-savings, creates a strong bias in favor 
of governance passivity likely to reinforce the sort of managerial 
autonomy with which Berle and Means would have been familiar. The 
term Berle–Means corporation thus remains appropriate short-hand for the 
paradigmatic American public company. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I charts the rise of the 
Berle–Means corporation, indicating in so doing that the separation of 
ownership and control with which Berle and Means became associated 
remained very much a work in progress when The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property was published in 1932. Section II discusses the 
explanation for ownership separating from control that was widely, if often 
implicitly, accepted through the early 1990s, namely that a strong 
managerial orientation and diffusion of share ownership inexorably 
followed from basic business logic. Section III considers, in an American 
context, theoretical explanations for ownership and control patterns 
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advanced since that point in time, organizing the analysis by reference to 
three core questions: (1) Why might those owning large blocks of shares 
want to exit or accept dilution of their stake? (2) Will there be demand for 
shares available for sale? (3) Will the new investors be inclined to exercise 
control themselves? 
Section IV of the Article switches the focus of the paper from the 
past to the present, drawing attention to arguments that institutional 
investors have collectively accumulated a sufficiently sizeable collective 
stake to displace the Berle–Means corporation. Section V reverts to a 
historical approach, discussing past patterns of behavior of institutional 
shareholders to show that a public company can be characterized by a 
separation of ownership and control even if institutional investors own the 
bulk of the shares. Section VI draws upon the insights Section V provides 
to argue that the Berle–Means corporation shorthand remains relevant 
today and likely will remain so for the foreseeable future. A conclusion 
follows. 
I. THE RISE OF THE BERLE–MEANS CORPORATION 
A description of a separation of ownership and control in America’s 
largest companies was the best-known feature of Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means’s renowned 1932 book The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. Fully diffused share ownership did not prevail, however, in a 
majority of large public firms at that point in time. The rise of the Berle–
Means corporation, marked by a dearth of dominant shareholders and by 
executives owning no more than a small fraction of the equity, would only 
be consolidated after World War II. 
A. Ownership and Control as of 1930 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property has long been 
recognized as a book of pivotal importance. Historian Robert Hessen 
wrote in 1983 as part of a symposium marking the 50th anniversary of 
publication, “Few American books have been as highly acclaimed . . . and 
fewer still enjoy as illustrious a reputation fifty years after they were 
published.”8 Esteemed management theorist Peter Drucker suggested in 
1991 that Berle and Means’s monograph was “arguably the most 
influential book in U.S. business history.”9 Sociologist Mark Mizruchi 
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maintained in 2004, “The field now known as corporate governance dates 
back to Berle and Means’s classic work.”10 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property addressed several 
themes, including documenting a growing concentration of economic 
power in large corporations and exploring the role judicially generated 
equitable constraints could and should play in limiting the exercise of 
managerial power.11 However, the primary theme, occupying two-thirds 
of the book, was the separation of ownership and control in large business 
enterprises.12 The Modern Corporation and Private Property would in 
turn become best known for this feature.13 George Dent, a corporate law 
academic, said in 1989 that since the book had been published, “corporate 
law’s central dilemma has been the separation of ownership and control in 
public corporations.”14 Fellow corporate law professor William Bratton 
wrote in 2001 that the “The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
still speaks in an active voice. Since it first appeared in 1932, corporate 
law has been reckoning with its description of a problem of management 
responsibility stemming from a separation of ownership and control.”15 
Historians Kenneth Lipartito and Yumiko Morii maintained in a Berle 
symposium article published in 2010 that the book “[h]as attracted 
historians, economists, policy makers, and the popular press, all of whom 
accepted its thesis on the separation of ownership and management in the 
modern corporation.”16 
One might infer from the notoriety of Berle and Means’s separation 
of ownership and control thesis that dominant shareholders were passé in 
large U.S. companies by 1932. Berle and Means indeed referred in The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property to “a revolution” that “has 
destroyed the unity that we commonly call property—has divided 
ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it” 
and declared that “the dispersion of ownership has gone to tremendous 
lengths among the largest companies and has progressed to a considerable 
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extent among the medium sized.”17 In fact, the diffusion of share 
ownership with which the book is so closely associated still had some 
distance to go. 
Berle and Means relied on empirical analysis to document their claim 
that a separation of ownership and control characterized large U.S. 
companies. Drawing on industrial manuals, press reports, and street 
knowledge, they reported on control arrangements in the 42 railroads, 52 
public utilities, and 106 industrials which comprised America’s largest 
200 non-financial corporations, ranked by assets.18 Berle and Means 
categorized companies as being under (1) “private ownership” (an 
individual or compact group owning most or all of the shares); (2) 
“majority control” (ownership of a majority of stock by a single individual 
or small group); (3) “control through legal device” (use of corporate 
“pyramids,” non-voting shares and voting trusts to secure the legal power 
to vote a majority of the voting shares); (4) “minority control” (an 
individual or small group holding a sufficiently large minority stake to 
dominate the affairs of the company); (5) “management control” (no 
individual or small group having a minority interest large enough—
defined as 20%—to hold sway); and (6) in receivership.19 
Berle and Means’s data did not match up fully with their “revolution” 
rhetoric. Only a minority (88) of their 200 companies qualified as 
management controlled and only 21 of these 88 were categorized as 
management controlled on the basis of direct evidence of a lack of a 
shareholder with an ownership stake of 20% or more.20 The other 
“management controlled” companies were ones where the locus of control 
was doubtful but was presumed to be held by management and where there 
was a dominant shareholder but that shareholder was a corporation that 
fell into the management control category.21 
While Berle and Means spoke of a “new condition” in large business 
enterprises they did acknowledge that a divorce between ownership and 
control was not yet a fully established fact.22 They said of the dispersion 
of the ownership of shares that, while “a rapidly increasing proportion of 
wealth appears to be taking this form,” “the separation of ownership and 
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control has not yet become complete.”23 A 1940 study by the Temporary 
National Economic Committee (TNEC), which had been established 
jointly by Congress and President Franklin Roosevelt to investigate the 
concentration of economic power in the United States, underscored that 
dominant shareholders remained prominent in large companies during the 
1930s.24 The TNEC sought to identify who controlled, as of 1939, 
America’s 200 largest non-financial corporations. Statutory powers 
authorizing data gathering were relied upon to ascertain the percentage of 
shares owned by the 20 largest stockholders in each firm and the TNEC’s 
efforts were praised for both accuracy and reliability.25 
The TNEC report distinguished between those companies under 
ownership control, either by a family or another corporation, and those 
with no center of ownership control, the category akin to Berle and 
Means’s management-controlled grouping.26 The TNEC assumed 
ownership control existed where there was a sizeable concentration of 
equity in the hands of an identifiable dominant group or the largest 
shareholders had managerial representation and remaining shareholdings 
were highly dispersed.27 Among the top 200 non-financial corporations, 
the TNEC found that only in 61 was there no center of control.28 Of the 
remaining 139 companies, the TNEC classified 77 as being under family 
control, 56 as being controlled by other corporations, and 6 as being under 
joint control of family and corporate interest groups.29 The TNEC 
concluded control through ownership (albeit usually minority control) was 
the typical situation in large business enterprises.30 
B. Consolidation of the Separation of Ownership and Control 
While Berle and Means’s 1932 declaration that ownership and 
control were apart “in large measure” likely was an overstatement at that 
point in time, matters were evolving in the direction they had suggested. 
In 1943, the New York Times reported that “wealthy individuals [and] 
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estates . . . are disposing of important stockholdings piecemeal. . . . [T]his 
liquidation is being absorbed by an army of relatively small 
investors . . . .  The current period will go down in financial history as one 
in which important changes were made in the ownership of 
corporations.”31 A dozen years later the same newspaper said of public 
companies and their executives: 
A generation or so ago, most corporations were held by small groups 
of investors. Often as not, members of the founding family held the 
majority of shares. Then came in succession the Great Depression, 
high taxes on incomes and estates and the need for new capital in a 
rapidly growing economy. Result: today, the stock of many 
companies is widely distributed among thousands or even hundreds 
of thousands of shareholders. 
Management, in effect, has become a high-priced employe[e].32 
A 1955 study of the background of chief executives and board 
chairmen of large companies covering 1900, 1925, and 1950 confirmed 
“the general trend is toward increasing management control” unaffiliated 
with substantial share ownership, evidenced by the fact that as of 1950 at 
least three-quarters of the chief executives and chairmen owned less than 
one percent of their company’s voting stock.33 
In time, Berle would agree that the emergent historical process he 
and Means had identified was subsequently consolidated in a way that 
made a separation of ownership and control the norm in large public 
companies. In 1959 he said, “A ‘big corporation’ of the year 1925 was still 
primarily a personal expression. In 1955, the same corporation . . . is quite 
obviously an institution.”34 He noted the same year that while as of 1929 
large enterprises were usually under the “working control” of 
shareholders, “management control . . . meaning . . . that no large 
concentrated stockholding exists that maintains a close working 
relationship with management” had become “the norm” with “the bulk of 
American industry now.”35 In a 1962 New York Times article Berle said of 
public company shares, “Distribution continues to split up big holdings. 
Most big corporations are not—indeed cannot be—controlled by any 
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shareholder.”36 He observed similarly in the Columbia Law Review the 
same year: “No one . . . now denies the essential separation of ownership 
of the large corporation from its control. Thirty years have markedly 
accentuated this separation.”37 
Berle’s assessment reflected the general consensus. Forbes indicated 
in 1957, “[T]oday’s manager works for no single imperious owner. Instead 
he serves thousands, even hundreds of thousands of stockholder 
owners.”38 Harvard economist Edward Mason observed in 1959, “Almost 
everyone now agrees that in the large corporation, the owner is, in general 
a passive recipient; that typically control is in the hands of management; 
and that management normally selects its own replacements.”39 Princeton 
sociologist Wilbert Moore wrote in 1962 that “the Berle–Means doctrine” 
had “achieved wide acceptance” and that managers had “acquired a large 
degree of independence from stockholders.”40 
While by the beginning of the 1960s it was widely accepted that in 
large public companies diffuse share ownership was the norm and 
dominant shareholders were anomalous, empirical data on point was “all 
too often scanty or badly out of date.”41 The TNEC’s 1940 study remained 
the best source.42 Matters changed in the 1960s and 1970s, with a number 
of studies of ownership and control being conducted. Economist Robert 
Larner, for instance, sought to replicate Berle and Means’s methodology 
using data from 1963.43 He reported that 75% of the 500 largest companies 
in the United States were under management control and said his results 
showed the “managerial revolution” was “close to complete.”44 Business 
Week agreed, noting that Larner’s data established that “[m]anagement . . . 
holds sway in all but a minor share of America’s corporate giants.”45 
Additional research mostly confirmed Larner’s finding that 
dispersed ownership was the norm in large American business enterprises 
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in the 1960s and 1970s.46 There were studies indicating that only a 
minority of large companies had fully diffuse share ownership but most of 
these used a low threshold of share ownership of 5% or more to find 
“control.”47 Noted political theorist Robert Dahl said in 1970 that “[e]very 
literate person now rightly takes for granted what Berle and Means 
established four decades ago in their famous study.”48 There was, by that 
point in time, a solid empirical foundation for the received wisdom. 
II. THE BERLE–MEANS CORPORATION AS A  
PRODUCT OF BUSINESS LOGIC 
Having documented the rise of the Berle–Means corporation in the 
United States, we will consider now why a separation of ownership and 
control became the norm in large public companies. Accounting for 
patterns of ownership and control in the corporate context is not a 
straightforward exercise, as multiple factors plausibly contribute to 
prevailing arrangements. Economists Randall Morck and Lloyd Steier 
have said of theories advanced to explain cross-country variations, “It 
would be wonderful for economists if we could conclude that one is 
correct and discard the others, but economics is rarely so simple.”49 The 
United States is no different in this regard. Finance professor Marco Becht 
and economic historian Bradford DeLong conceded in a 2005 paper 
seeking to account for the dearth of controlling shareholders in U.S. public 
companies “the story we have to tell turns out not to be a neat one.”50 
While providing a definitive explanation why a divorce of ownership 
and control took place in the United States probably is not feasible, 
plausible conjectures regarding contributing factors can be offered. A 
helpful way to start is to consider the extent to which basic business logic 
accounts for what occurred. Until the early 1990s, it was universally, if 
largely implicitly, accepted that no further explanation was required for 
the separation of ownership and control in large firms. Doubts arose at that 
point, which provided a platform for the development of theories regarding 
ownership and control canvassed in Section III. 
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A. The Business Logic Underlying the Separation of 
Ownership and Control 
While it is now widely acknowledged that explaining ownership 
patterns in large corporations is not a straightforward exercise, doubts 
about why the Berle–Means corporation moved to the forefront of 
America’s corporate economy were slow to emerge. Once a consensus 
developed that there in fact was a separation of ownership and control in 
large American corporations, to the extent that there was debate about the 
phenomenon, it focused on whether the stockholder passivity associated 
with diffuse share ownership begat counterproductively unconstrained 
executive power that necessitated a substantial regulatory response.51 
Underpinning the discourse was a widespread belief that, as a matter of 
business logic, most large corporations would feature diffuse share 
ownership and managerial control. 
The consensus regarding the business logic explanation for the 
divorce of ownership and control in large firms was typically implicit.52 
For instance, a review of a 1968 reissue of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property noted, when describing the managerially controlled firms 
dominating the American economy, that even “[m]odern critics of the 
large corporation usually take for granted its inevitability.”53 Law 
professor Nicholas Wolfson, very much a fan rather than a critic of big 
business, nevertheless made explicit the reasoning involved in 1984, 
saying “[t]he separation of ownership and control is the inevitable product 
of the need to maximize managerial efficiency in corporate firms.”54 Such 
reasoning harkened back to The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, where Berle and Means said, “Dispersion in the ownership of 
separate enterprises appears to be inherent in the corporate system. It has 
already proceeded far, it is rapidly increasing, and appears to be an 
inevitable development.”55 
Financial imperatives were part of the logic assumed to underpin the 
managerially dominated corporation’s move to the forefront. Companies 
needing to raise large amounts of capital seemingly could proceed most 
readily if their equity was carved up into small units that could be 
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distributed publicly to thousands of investors.56 Dispersed share ownership 
would then typically follow in turn. This logic seemingly appealed to Berle 
and Means, who observed that “[i]n a truly large corporation, the 
investment necessary for majority ownership is so considerable as to make 
control extremely expensive.”57 Berle struck a similar chord in 1954, 
indicating a separation of ownership and control “was inevitable, granting 
that modern organizations of production and distribution must be so large 
as to be incapable of being owned by any individual or small group of 
individuals.”58 
Practical challenges associated with running large business 
enterprises also featured in the basic business logic assumed to underpin 
the divorce between ownership and control. As firms grew bigger, their 
operations were likely to become more complex and physically 
decentralized. Continued success under such circumstances, the thinking 
went, was contingent upon developing robust managerial capabilities 
buttressed by the hiring of career-oriented, professionally trained 
executives.59 Moreover, so long as companies refrained from treating 
substantial stock ownership as a necessary qualification for a top executive 
post, the talent pool from which senior management could be drawn would 
be greatly expanded.60 A split between ownership and control logically 
ensued. For instance, in 1957 business historian Thomas Cochran 
accounted for the two being divorced in large firms on the basis “that 
large-scale mass production and transportation hastened the shift toward 
managerial . . . control” with “the new big companies plac[ing] executive 
control in the hands of careerists, selected for their managerial ability. The 
professional executive needed to own no stock in the enterprise, and if he 
did buy some it was usually not enough to give him any great stake in the 
company profits.”61 
Alfred Chandler, a distinguished business historian best known for 
his work on how and why firms that pioneered the implementation of 
sophisticated managerial hierarchies in the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries achieved commercial preeminence,62 was probably the 
leading exponent of the close association between the bolstering of 
managerial capabilities and the growth and success of business enterprises. 
His “account of the managerial revolution, including the careful and 
methodical reasoning and mountainous store of evidence that seemed to 
support it, proved so compelling that few historians of business and 
technology took issue with it.”63 According to Chandler, a new 
transportation and communication infrastructure oriented around railways, 
telegraph networks and subsequently telephone service that was taking 
shape as the nineteenth century drew to a close meant for the first time 
successful firms were focusing on genuinely national markets for goods 
and services.64 At the same time, technological innovations such as mass 
generation of electric power were fostering previously unimaginable 
economies of scale and thereby encouraging the centralization of 
production in large plants.65 These changes set the scene for the emergence 
of what Chandler called “the modern business enterprise,” with well-
developed managerial hierarchies being the defining characteristic.66 
Companies that invested heavily in building managerial capabilities, 
Chandler argued, tended to prosper—and dominate—because they would 
be coordinating production, distribution and marketing more effectively 
than would be possible with heavy reliance on arm’s-length transactions 
between independent businesses.67 Hence, corporate success was 
associated with the growth of what Chandler termed in the late 1970s “the 
visible hand” of management at the expense of the “invisible hand” market 
forces constituted.68 
Chandler maintained that the managerially focused “visible hand” 
contributed to industrial and commercial success because large plants set 
up to exploit economies of scale had to feature effective capacity 
utilization, which in turn demanded “the constant attention of a managerial 
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team or hierarchy.”69 The national scale on which leading corporations had 
begun to operate also favored investment in managerial capabilities. 
Expansion into new regions combined with the rolling out of wider ranges 
of products created risks that those overseeing increasingly sprawling 
enterprises would be overwhelmed by the volume and complexity of 
assigned tasks and that policy and planning would be handled inefficiently 
by negotiations between far-flung corporate fiefdoms.70 The most 
effective response seemed to be a robust managerial hierarchy where 
divisional managers were assigned responsibility for running key business 
units day-to-day and senior head office executives dictated the general 
direction of the company supported by sophisticated financial control 
systems and cost management techniques.71 
Berle became aware of and acknowledged the connection between 
Chandler’s research and his own work on the separation of ownership and 
control. In a 1967 book entitled Power, he cited research by Chandler from 
the early 1960s when describing how “corporation bureaucracy” emerged 
in the opening decades of the twentieth century because “enterprises 
became too big for personal dictatorship.”72 Chandler in turn cited, in his 
1977 book The Visible Hand, Larner’s 1960s empirical research on 
ownership and control when saying “by the 1950s the managerial firm had 
become the standard form of modern business enterprise in major sectors 
of the American economy,” meaning “managerial capitalism had gained 
ascendancy over family and financial capitalism.”73 
Chandler only occasionally referred to Berle and Means in his work 
on the emergence of managerial capitalism.74 Nevertheless, he did 
acknowledge that Berle and Means launched debate about the implications 
of a separation of ownership from management.75 More generally, 
Chandler’s research on the business logic underpinning the growth of 
managerial hierarchies dovetailed neatly with their characterization of the 
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modern corporation as one where executives own only a small proportion 
of the shares were in charge.76 Economist Richard Langlois said in 2013,  
We learned early on from Berle and Means (1932) that, by the early 
twentieth century, the owner-managed firm had given way in the 
United States to a corporate form in which ownership was diffuse and 
inactive and in which control had effectively passed to managers. 
Then we learned from Chandler (1977) that this managerial revolu-
tion was both inevitable and desirable.77 
Ultimately, facets of Chandler’s research became combined with 
Berle and Means’s separation of ownership and control thesis to generate 
“a dominant theoretical narrative” that, in the late twentieth century, 
underpinned “our understanding of the evolution of corporate structure in 
the modern era.”78 Mark Roe described in 1994 a “dominant paradigm 
explaining the emergence and success of the large corporation in the 
United States” that saw “economies of scale and technology as producing 
a fragmentation of shareholding and a shift in power from shareholders to 
senior managers with specialized skills.”79 The Economist maintained 
similarly: 
For many years, it has been argued that the present shape of the 
American corporation, in which a vast and dispersed group of 
shareholders exercises little or no control over the firm’s managers, 
is in some way preordained. Organising firms like this, runs the 
argument, is simply the most efficient way of adapting to the 
demands of modern capitalism.80 
The received wisdom, in sum, was that basic business logic dictated that 
professional executives owning only a small percentage of widely held 
shares would control the typical modern large corporation. 
B. Doubts Arise 
Inconveniently for those in the post-World War II era who believed 
business logic preordained that a successful large company would be 
widely held and run by career-oriented executives lacking a substantial 
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equity stake, from a global perspective, the norm for major business 
enterprises was (and is) to have dominant shareholders.81 The standard 
global ownership pattern, however, appeared to be beside the point. 
Managerially oriented American companies were the powerhouses of the 
global corporate economy during the middle decades of the twentieth 
century, with 44 of the largest 50 global companies being from the United 
States as of 1959.82 Time said in 1960, “[T]he U.S. corporation has, by and 
large, used its awesome efficiency well [and] has become a model for the 
world.”83 Economist and journalist Leonard Silk drew attention in 1969 to 
“Europe’s recognition of and concern over the remarkable drive of 
American business management.”84 Given corporate America’s success, 
countries with corporate economies with different institutional 
characteristics could be safely ignored; Mark Roe and fellow law professor 
Ronald Gilson elaborated on why in a 1993 law review article: 
The “traditional” model of American corporate governance presented 
the Berle–Means corporation—characterized by a separation of 
ownership and management resulting from the need of growing 
enterprises for capital and the specialization of management—as the 
pinnacle in the evolution of organizational forms. Given this model’s 
dominance, the study of comparative corporate governance was 
peripheral; governance systems differing from the American 
paradigm were dismissed as mere intermediate steps on the path to 
perfection, or as evolutionary dead-ends, the neanderthals of 
corporate governance. Neither laggards nor dead-ends made 
compelling objects of study.85 
While the success American companies were enjoying meant it was 
understandable that, following World War II, there was an undisturbed 
consensus that business logic preordained a separation of ownership and 
control in large firms, the underlying economic context had changed 
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substantially by the time the 1990s got underway. It was widely believed 
American corporations were losing ground to German and Japanese 
rivals.86 Share ownership in large companies in these countries was 
considerably more concentrated than in the United States.87 This 
confluence of circumstances implied—contrary to the business logic 
presumed to underpin the Berle–Means corporation’s American 
dominance—that an ownership and control framework different from that 
prevailing in the United States was fully capable of delivering similar, or 
even superior, results.88 The possibility that successful large firms could 
be organized in various ways raised, in turn, a question that decades of 
American corporate success had obscured: why was the American system 
of corporate governance oriented around diffuse share ownership 
exemplified by a dearth of dominant shareholders?89 We consider leading 
explanations next. 
III. OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RISE OF  
THE BERLE–MEANS CORPORATION 
With the unraveling in the 1990s of the implicit consensus that 
ownership separated from control due to business logic, various theories 
would be advanced to explain ownership patterns in large firms. It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to offer any sort of definitive account of 
why, unlike in most other countries, the Berle–Means corporation came to 
dominate in the United States and remained preeminent.90 Relevant factors 
can be identified effectively, however, by focusing on three core questions 
one needs to address to explain why ownership becomes divorced from 
control in corporations91: (1) Why might those owning large blocks of 
shares want to exit or accept dilution of their stake? (2) Will there be 
demand for shares available for sale? (3) Will the new investors be 
inclined to exercise control themselves? 
Once we have canvassed the core questions in a general way, we will 
use them as our reference point while considering now well-known 
theories about ownership and control arrangements that potentially explain 
why the Berle–Means corporation moved to the forefront in the United 
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States. In so doing, we will take into account observations of Adolf Berle’s 
that shed light on the leading theory on point, namely that the nature of 
corporate and securities law is pivotal. We will also consider two variables 
not otherwise addressed that likely contributed to the separation of 
ownership and control in American public companies. 
A. Core Questions 
With the three core questions that may provide insights as to why 
ownership will tend to separate from control in large business enterprises, 
the answer to each is by no means obvious. With question (1), substantial 
blockholders, due to the influence over corporate affairs associated with 
their voting power, can benefit from their status in ways unavailable to 
other shareholders by securing “private benefits of control.”92 Given the 
advantages associated with being a blockholder, why stand down?93 As a 
1926 article in the Los Angeles Times indicated, “Naturally, the owners of 
an established business are not anxious to bargain for capital on terms that 
involves the possible loss of control.”94 
The basic business logic that up to the 1990s was assumed to 
underpin the separation of ownership and control in large American firms 
implied that blockholders would be compelled to exit because their firms 
would lose out in the marketplace to better-run, managerially dominated 
firms. The success that German and Japanese companies were enjoying at 
that point in time undermined this reasoning. The fact that successful 
corporations from such jurisdictions frequently had dominant shareholders 
implied that the presence of such “core” investors in no way precluded 
faring well against rivals.95 
Ironically, given that Chandler was the preeminent advocate of the 
contribution managerial hierarchy made to business success, he ultimately 
acknowledged that the unwinding of founder or family holdings was not 
essential for a corporation to benefit from a sophisticated managerial 
infrastructure.96 Instead, so long as suitably effective executives were 
vested with responsibility for running the business, the benefits of 
managerial hierarchies could be available even if a founder, his successors, 
or both retained a dominant equity stake.97 Under such circumstances, the 
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core investors would be ongoing beneficiaries of managerial control rather 
than its victims. 
If basic business logic does not compel blockholder exit then why 
would they opt out? Berle addressed the point, albeit rather briskly, in a 
1952 New York Times article, saying, “Fifty years ago American 
corporations did have identifiable owners. They died, split up their 
holdings, paid inheritance taxes, sold out, gave away their fortunes and 
otherwise dispersed.”98 Given the lure of private benefits of control, it 
seems unlikely that, death aside, dominant shareholders would have 
capitulated quite as readily as Berle implied. Why in fact did they “split 
up their holdings” or sell out completely? Sometimes dominant 
shareholders will exit because there is a window of opportunity where their 
firm’s shares are advantageously priced.99 Other times a blockholder will 
sell shares because of a need for cash to pursue personal goals. For 
instance, to finance an expensive space rocket project, Jeff Bezos, founder 
of e-tailing powerhouse Amazon, sold $2 billion worth of stock in 2017, 
which reduced his stake in the company to 16%.100 
The 1955 quote above from the New York Times that referred to taxes 
and the Depression in the 1930s when discussing the unwinding of control 
in public companies offers clues, likely more relevant to that era, as to why 
dominant shareholders might exit.101 Sustained erosion of profits and 
income can leave the dominant shareholder of a business exposed and 
welcoming the opportunity to sell out, despite the theoretical potential for 
extracting private benefits of control.102 The combination of tough times 
during the 1930s and the economic uncertainties and high taxes associated 
with World War II103 likely meant numerous that blockholders were in 
precisely this position.104 Blockholders had a further tax-related incentive 
to exit because capital gains arising from the sale of shares were taxed at 
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a much lower rate than income, with the rate being further reduced for 
assets held for a substantial period of time.105 
As for core question (2), even if blockholders are prepared (or even 
eager) to exit, it is not self-evident why there will be sufficient demand for 
shares to permit the unwinding of dominant stakes. If those with capital 
available to invest buy shares in a company which continues to have a 
dominant shareholder, they can fall victim to an extraction of the private 
benefits of control. The circumstances may be no better in a company 
characterized by a separation of ownership and control. This is because 
executives owning only a small percentage of the shares will have 
incentives to put their own interests first, thereby imposing what are often 
characterized as “agency costs” on investors.106 
Matters are also somewhat complicated with question (3). Assume 
there is sufficient demand for shares to facilitate exit by incumbent 
blockholders. There may be one investor (or a close alliance of investors) 
among the new shareholders who will want to obtain a dominant stake, 
whether because of private benefits of control or an intention to profit by 
setting the company’s strategic direction. One powerful blockholder may 
simply be substituted for another. If this occurs regularly, how does 
ownership separate from control? 
B. Key Theories 
In the early 1990s, Mark Roe kicked off a lively debate about the 
determinants of ownership and control in large firms. He did so with a 
theory that largely took for granted the first two of the core questions that 
need to be addressed to ascertain why ownership separates from control, 
implicitly assuming founders and their successors had good reasons to exit 
and that it was sensible for investors to buy shares in public companies. 
What he sought to explain was why major financial intermediaries—such 
as banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds that had 
the wherewithal to buy enough shares in public companies to accumulate 
dominant positions—failed to follow through.107 
Roe suggested that, at several points in the twentieth century, 
powerful financial intermediaries were poised to accumulate substantial 
ownership blocks in American business firms, but politicians, mindful of 
a deeply ingrained popular mistrust of concentrated financial power, 
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derailed the process.108 Roe identified a series of legislative provisions 
that, at various points in time, discouraged financial intermediaries from 
taking up large ownership stakes in public companies. Examples included 
rules precluding commercial banks from owning and dealing in securities, 
legislation discouraging insurance companies from investing in shares, 
and regulations penalizing mutual funds and pension funds otherwise 
inclined to accumulate big blocks of shares in a narrow range of 
companies.109 
Roe subsequently advanced an additional politically oriented theory 
regarding ownership and control that implicitly focused on the second of 
the three core questions. He hypothesized that public companies with 
widely dispersed share ownership are less likely to play a key role in “left-
wing” social democracies than they are in “right-wing” countries.110 Roe 
reasoned that, with social democracies favoring employees over investors, 
those running large firms in such jurisdictions cater to employee 
preferences and give shareholders short shrift. Investors, in turn, steer clear 
of shares, thereby precluding the development of the diffuse share 
ownership associated with the Berle–Means corporation.111 According to 
Roe, the United States never fit this pattern, with the class-based economic 
conflict that gives rise to social democracy failing to be sufficiently 
pronounced. This had the effect of “keeping the pressures low that would 
make diffuse shareholders wary of leaving their money in managers’ 
hands.”112 
A hypothesis first advanced in the late 1990s to explain cross-border 
differences in stock market development113 addresses, at least in 
theoretical terms, all three core questions salient to a determination of 
when ownership will separate from control in large firms. This was what 
became known as the “law matters” thesis.114 With respect to ownership 
patterns, the thinking is that the extent to which corporate and securities 
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law within a particular country protects minority shareholders does much 
to dictate whether large business enterprises will have diffuse or 
concentrated share ownership.115 This would become the most widely 
cited and influential explanation for cross-country ownership and control 
patterns.116 
To grasp the logic underpinning the law matters thesis, assume a 
country has laws that closely regulate transactions between companies and 
their “insiders” (directors and key shareholders), preclude opportunistic 
conduct by those insiders, and impose comprehensive disclosure 
requirements on companies that offer shares for sale to the public. With 
such rules in place, blockholders should lack the scope to extract 
meaningful private benefits of control and thus may well be prepared to 
exit. Concomitantly, investors should feel “comfortable” buying stocks 
available for purchase. This is because they will know that the law 
circumscribes exploitation of outside shareholders and that disclosure 
regulation will help to address informational asymmetries that can afflict 
those who own equity in public companies.117 With few opportunities 
being available to take advantage of minority shareholders, those investors 
buying shares would be less inclined to forsake the benefits of 
diversification by accumulating dominant stakes in a single firm or a small 
portfolio of public corporations. Diffuse share ownership thus likely 
would become the norm in public companies. 
The law matters thesis appears to fit the facts well in the United 
States. It has a stock market-oriented corporate economy (i.e., well-
developed equity markets by global standards), diffuse share ownership 
has been sufficiently prevalent for large firms to be characterized as Berle–
Means corporations, and its legal regime is thought to offer substantial 
protection for investors.118 But did the configuration of corporate and 
securities law actually help to prompt the separation of ownership and 
control that occurred? The law matters thesis implies that having legal 
rules in place that provide significant stockholder protection is a pre-
condition for the blockholder exit and investor demand necessary for 
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diffuse share ownership in large firms.119 Given that a separation of 
ownership and control became the prevalent arrangement in large 
American public companies during the middle decades of the twentieth 
century, it follows that the law should have been providing robust 
protection for shareholders beforehand. 
With respect to corporate law, which is state-based, there is a less 
than ideal fit with the law matters explanation for dispersed share 
ownership in large American firms. Delaware has been “the corporation 
homeland of America” at least as far back as 1930.120 When the 
quantitative methodology used to measure corporate law for the purposes 
of testing the law matters thesis across countries is deployed historically, 
it indicates that Delaware offered mediocre protection to shareholders 
throughout the first half the twentieth century as well as subsequently.121 
Moreover, according to Berle and Means, with the rights corporate law 
made available, the expense and uncertainty associated with litigation left 
“the stockholder virtually helpless,” meaning “a stockholder’s right lies in 
the expectation of fair dealing rather than in the ability to enforce a series 
of supposed legal claims.”122 
On the other hand, federal reform occurring in the mid-1930s 
potentially lends credence to a law matters explanation of the separation 
of ownership and control in the United States. As part of the “New Deal” 
Franklin Roosevelt launched shortly after becoming president in 1933, a 
set of laws was introduced that plausibly would have prompted dominant 
shareholders to contemplate exit and made investors feel more 
“comfortable” about buying shares at prices sufficiently generous to make 
exit seem worthwhile. The federal Securities Act of 1933 required 
disclosure of material financial information about public offerings 
companies made.123 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.), prohibited various forms 
of market manipulation and imposed substantial periodic disclosure 
requirements on publicly traded companies.124 
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Tougher laws, in the form of federal securities regulation, plausibly 
did intensify the divorce between ownership and control in progress in 
larger American companies. The federal securities laws enacted in the 
1930s have been widely hailed as measures that restored investors’ faith 
in stocks after the harrowing 1929 stock market crash.125 Moreover, the 
timing fits well with the separation of ownership and control chronology 
already sketched out, in that dominant shareholders exited with some 
regularity in the quarter-century following regulatory reform.126 
Management professors Allen Kaufman and Lawrence Zacharias have 
indeed suggested “New Deal securities legislation in effect authorized 
federal officials to reinforce the shareholder’s ownership role under state 
laws and to reduce the risks of separating ownership from control.”127 
Adolf Berle’s views in the early 1960s regarding federal securities 
legislation lend credence to a “law matters” explanation for dispersed 
share ownership in the American context. In particular, he expressed 
support for the idea that federal reforms had contributed to an environment 
where investors could be confident about how public companies would be 
run. He also suggested ideas set forth in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property had helped to create momentum in favor of introduction 
of the relevant regulatory changes. He dealt with these points in the 1962 
law review article where he acknowledged that the separation of 
ownership and control had progressed considerably in the thirty years 
since he and Means collaborated: 
I gladly concede that the dishonest conflict of interest between 
management and shareholder ownership—that is, abuse by 
management of a position in which it can divert a part of the profit 
and income stream to itself—has not been accentuated. Again, it 
seems to me, our work may have been partly responsible. By law and 
stock-exchange regulation, management is now obliged to file and 
publish annual accounts of its trust, and quarterly interim reports of 
its progress. It must make general disclosure of its operations[,] a 
recommendation made in The Modern Corporation[.] In all respects 
the businessmen-managers now operate under the glare of perpetual 
publicity . . . . While human nature probably has not changed much, 
community standards do develop, and they have. These have been 
implemented by institutions tending to enforce them [including] the 
Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .128 
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While a plausible case can be made that federal securities law 
contributed to the diffusion of share ownership in large American 
companies, the evidence is not clear-cut. There is also reason to doubt 
whether Berle or The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
contributed substantially to the introduction of federal securities 
regulation. Considering the latter point first, Berle was by no means alone 
in suggesting that his work with Means was influential.129 Forbes said in 
1958, “Damning greedy management for its frequent disdain of 
stockholders’ interests, Berle was author in fact and spirit of much New 
Deal legislation controlling corporate insiders.”130 The New York Times 
review of the 1968 reissue of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property said, “Public regulation of the stock exchanges is a large 
monument to any book.”131 Richard Posner, having just moved from 
academia to the bench, wrote in a 1982 judgment, “The intellectual 
patrimony of the Securities Exchange Act [of 1934] includes Berle and 
Means’s influential book.”132 
The role The Modern Corporation and Private Property played in 
fostering the introduction of federal securities regulation was, in fact, 
rather modest. The book identified issues to which a regulatory response 
might well be thought appropriate.133 Nevertheless, it did not set out a case 
in favor of the sort of statutory and administrative reforms the 1933 and 
1934 Acts encompassed.134 
Berle, for his part, was a member of a “brain trust” advising 
Roosevelt during the 1932 presidential election campaign.135 
Nevertheless, Berle played little role in the design of the federal securities 
laws that were enacted.136 Moreover, when the changes were made, Berle 
was unenthusiastic, as he believed the steps being taken were not 
sufficiently fundamental and far-reaching.137 He said of the 1933 Act the 
year it was promulgated, “[T]his form of measure, while salutary, is not of 
supreme importance.”138 Berle noted the legislation “cuts off certain 
illegitimate uses” but said “it leaves unsolved the major questions” such 
as “the problem of who is entitled to the increment of value arising from 
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organization, or the increment of power arising from control. Those 
problems are left to the future.”139 
As for the contribution federal securities reform made to the divorce 
between ownership and control that was consolidated between the 1932 
publication of The Modern Corporation and Private Property and the 
decades immediately following World War II, if legislative change indeed 
was decisive, federal intervention should have elicited a reasonably rapid 
boost to investor confidence. Such a surge in faith in stocks would have 
created sufficiently robust demand for shares at prices generous enough to 
induce blockholder exit. In fact, stock markets in the United States were 
in the doldrums for at least two decades following federal intervention in 
securities markets. The number of shareholders flatlined, public offering 
activity was below historical norms, and the number of companies traded 
on national stock exchanges stagnated.140 Even by the mid-1950s, with the 
stock market performing well and the number of shareholders steadily 
increasing, jitters remained as Congressional testimony by prominent 
economist John Kenneth Galbraith paralleling conditions with those in 
place in 1929 prompted a stock market swoon.141 The hiatus between 
reform and the full restoration of investor confidence suggests that, even 
if the enactment of federal securities law contributed to the unwinding of 
large stock ownership stakes following the publication of The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property, there were additional causes. Two 
variables not accounted for thus far stand out: regulation of utilities and 
merger activity. 
C. Additional Variables 
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA),142 a 
legislative measure designed to simplify the corporate structure of the 
utilities industry, substantially unwound over time control blocks in a 
sector where they were particularly prevalent. It was uncommon for an 
American public company to have a dominant corporate shareholder in a 
pyramidal arrangement during the opening decades of the twentieth 
century.143 The arrangement was standard, however, in the utility sector, 
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with numerous publicly traded utility companies having another 
company—typically itself a utility company—as a dominant shareholder. 
For instance, 14 of the 52 utility companies in Berle and Means’s sample 
of the 200 largest non-financial companies had pyramidal ownership 
features, a considerably higher proportion than for other types of 
companies.144 Though legal challenges blunted the full force of PUHCA 
until the 1940s, by the early 1950s reorganizations occurring pursuant to 
the legislation meant the end of the road for the corporate pyramid in the 
one economic sector where it truly flourished.145 
Merger activity also likely helped to foster the separation of 
ownership and control occurring during the middle decades of the 
twentieth century, at least from the late 1940s onwards. Depending on the 
financing method, mergers can elicit diffusion of share ownership among 
companies conducting acquisitions.146 If an acquiring company issues new 
voting shares to carry out a share-for-share exchange with the target 
company’s shareholders, executing the merger will inevitably dilute, to 
some degree, a blockholder’s stake in the acquiring company. The result 
will be the same if the target company shareholders are paid in cash raised 
from a public offering of voting shares by the acquirer, assuming the 
dominant stockholder does not buy a percentage of the shares matching or 
exceeding current holdings. 
Merger activity was negligible during the 1930s and the first half of 
the 1940s but increased during the second half of the 1940s and the 
1950s.147 This surge may well have helped to foster ownership dispersion. 
A 1959 Business Week article on Adolf Berle and share ownership, entitled 
Where Managers Get Their Power, illustrates contemporary awareness of 
the impact mergers could have on ownership structure.148 The article 
traced the history of a hypothetical firm launched in the late nineteenth 
century that made metal animal traps. The hypothetical company went 
public in the early 1940s as American Metalworking to raise capital to 
meet wartime demand. Descendants of the founders still had a controlling 
interest. As the 1950s drew to a close, the company was a diversified 
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enterprise known as American Products Inc. with 100,000 shareholders 
and no individual owning more than 1% of the stock. What happened? For 
the hypothetical firm “[p]ostwar growth was a whoosh,” with the firm 
carrying out a dozen acquisitions financed partly by profits but also by a 
series of public offerings of securities that presumably greatly diluted the 
stake held by the founders’ descendants.149 To the extent that the American 
Metalworking hypothetical captured reality for U.S. companies, merger 
activity would have contributed to the rise of the Berle–Means 
corporation. 
IV. THE FALL OF THE BERLE–MEANS CORPORATION? 
Having gone backwards in time to account for the rise of the Berle–
Means corporation, we now switch to the present day to canvass its 
possible demise. We will consider initially claims advanced that the Berle–
Means corporation will soon be displaced as a symbol of corporate 
America, if it has not been displaced already. We will then find out that, if 
the fate of the Berle–Means corporation has been sealed, this is not 
because it has become the norm for public companies to have a single 
shareholder or a tight coalition of shareholders owning a dominant stake. 
Instead, institutional investors, considered on a collective basis, are 
ostensibly pivotal. Sections V and VI canvass the position of institutional 
shareholders. 
A. The Berle–Means Corporation Under Threat? 
While the Berle–Means corporation did not move fully into the 
ascendancy until the 1950s, it appeared to be a durable construct once 
preeminence was achieved. Mark Roe only developed the nomenclature in 
the early 1990s,150 assuming in so doing that it remained relevant at that 
point. For instance, in his 1994 book Strong Managers, Weak Owners, he 
connected Berle and Means with the present day, saying their “classic 
analysis . . . announced what came to be the dominant paradigm” and that 
“Berle and Means ‘discovered’ the modern corporation.”151 
Others subsequently affirmed the ongoing relevance of Berle and 
Means’s characterization of the American public company. Economists 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny, in a 1999 article that provided empirical evidence on cross-border 
ownership patterns indicating that the United States was out of step with 
much of the rest of the world because blockholders were a rarity, said of 
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the United States, “The Berle and Means image has clearly stuck” even if 
it had “begun to show some wear” because there were various empirical 
studies showing “a modest concentration of ownership.”152 Law professor 
Arthur Pinto, in a 2010 synopsis of corporate governance in the United 
States, remarked upon “[t]he predominance of the Berle–Means 
Corporation.”153 
While the Berle–Means corporation had a good run after its 
ascendance, speculation has been rife that its era will end soon, if it has 
not ended already. Management professor Gerald Davis argued, in a Berle 
symposium article published in 2011, that “[i]n another generation, the 
Berle and Means corporation may be just a memory.”154 Ronald Gilson 
and Jeff Gordon claimed two years later, “The Berle–Means description 
of the distribution of U.S. equity ownership simply is no longer correct.”155 
Fellow legal academics Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst 
asserted in 2017 that “the scenario of dispersed ownership described by 
Berle and Means no longer approximates reality, not even for the largest 
publicly traded corporations” and suggested “current share ownership is 
significantly more concentrated than the level described by Berle and 
Means.”156 The funeral rites that have been read to the Berle–Means 
corporation should not be accepted, however, at face value. As we will see 
next, it remains rare for larger public companies to have a dominant 
shareholder. Section V indicates that the manner in which institutional 
investors conduct themselves means that functionally a separation of 
ownership and control remains prevalent. 
B. The Return of Controlled Corporations? 
The Berle–Means corporation moved to the forefront of the 
American corporate economy when shareholders with sufficiently large 
ownership stakes to dictate outcomes when voting became the exception 
to the rule in large companies.157 Mark Roe has said that “a shareholder 
with 25% of the company’s stock could veto empire-building acquisitions, 
question managerial performance, and in the extreme instance replace the 
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managers.”158 One might logically expect that the Berle–Means 
corporation’s supposed demise is due to a revival of shareholders of this 
sort. Despite speculation that shareholders with dominant stakes are 
becoming more prevalent in American public companies,159 there has been 
no such trend. A 2016 study of ownership patterns in the S&P 1500 stock 
market index, carried out on behalf of the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center Institute (IRRCI) and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
makes this clear.160 
The IRRCI/ISS study focused on “controlled companies,” with 
corporations qualifying in one of two circumstances.161 The first was 
where a significant shareholder, or cohesive shareholder group, owned 
30% or more of the voting shares. The second was where there was a 
multi-class capital structure in place that allocated de facto control through 
share classes providing disproportionately large voting rights or enhanced 
board election rights. The IRRCI/ISS study found, “Contrary to common 
belief, the number of controlled companies has declined recently,” with 
only 105, or 7%, of firms in the S&P 1500 qualifying.162 As per the Berle–
Means corporation characterization, then, stockholders with sufficient 
voting clout to dictate outcomes in most circumstances are very much the 
exception to the rule in sizeable American public firms.163 
The small number of controlled companies needs to be borne in mind 
when considering Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst’s claim that ownership and 
control is currently more concentrated than it was in 1932. When they 
drew upon Berle and Means’s data to compare 1932 with the present day, 
they excluded from their calculations corporations that had a shareholder 
or tight coalition of shareholders with dominant voting power.164 While 
such companies are a rarity among larger public companies today, they 
made up a majority of the 200 companies Berle and Means considered.165 
Comparing all large companies rather than just those lacking a major 
shareholder would, in all likelihood, reveal ownership is considerably 
more widely dispersed today than it was in 1932. 
Among the 105 companies in the IRRCI/ISS study with controlling 
shareholders, there were 27 firms with a shareholder or shareholder group 
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owning 30% or more of the shares and 78 with multi-class capital 
structures. The growing popularity of multi-class shares among tech-
oriented companies going public has been widely reported, with prominent 
examples including Mark Zuckerberg with Facebook in 2012 and Fitbit 
Inc. and Box Inc. in 2015.166 However, only a small minority of companies 
that join the stock market have such arrangements in place.167 Indeed, the 
IRRCI/ISS study indicated the number of S&P 1500 companies where 
control existed due to a multi-class capital structure actually declined 
slightly from 79 in 2012.168 
The IRRCI/ISS study did not take into account an increase in 2017 
and 2018 of the number of venture-capital backed tech IPOs that provided 
for multi-class capital structures, exemplified by Snap becoming the first 
major company since at least 2000 to go public while offering shares with 
no voting rights attached.169 Nevertheless, such arrangements are unlikely 
to displace single-handed the Berle–Means corporation in the foreseeable 
future. Multi-class capital structures are too rare and too controversial—
S&P Dow Jones announced in 2017 that it would no longer add companies 
with multi-class shares to its iconic S&P 500 index170—for this to happen. 
V. THE QUALIFIED RISE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS 
We now know the Berle–Means corporation’s days are not numbered 
because of the prevalence of shareholders with sufficient voting clout to 
dictate outcomes with shareholder votes, whether due to major ownership 
blocs or multi-class capital structures. What threat is there, then? 
Institutional intermediaries who collectively own large stakes in public 
companies are said to be responsible. As Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst 
maintain, “[T]he trend toward dispersion has been reversed in subsequent 
decades by the rise of institutional investors.”171 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst’s institutional shareholder related 
critique of the Berle and Means characterization of ownership and control 
is oriented around the present day. Nevertheless, their reference to 
“subsequent decades” implies that the death knell for the Berle–Means 
                                                     
 166. Kristin Lin, The Big Number, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2015, at B6; John Plender, Governance 
Lessons Lost on Facebook, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, at 27.  
 167. Brian Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms That Go Public? 
12 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 405, 2018). This study focused on 
companies financed by venture capital. 
 168. KAMANJOH, supra note 160, at 15. 
 169. Maureen Farrell, Tech Founders Want IPO Cash—and Control, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2017, 
at A1; Rolfe Winkler & Maureen Farrell, Tech Founders Gain Power, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2018, at 
A1. 
 170. Chris Dieterich, Maureen Farrell & Sarah Krouse, Stock Indexes Push Back Against Dual-
Class Listings, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2017, at B1. 
 171. Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst, supra note 156, at 91. 
476 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:445 
corporation perhaps is not merely being sounded now. Its fate may instead 
have been sealed for a considerable period of time. That sort of chronology 
is at odds with the deployment of the Berle–Means corporation shorthand. 
Mark Roe coined the term less than thirty years ago, and it has been used 
with some regularity since then.172 To clarify matters, it is helpful to 
consider the history surrounding the rise of institutional shareholders in 
U.S. public companies. We do this here and turn to present day 
circumstances in Section VI. 
In his 1959 book Power Without Property, Adolf Berle said of 
investors in public companies, “[T]hese stockholders, though politely still 
called ‘owners,’ are passive.”173 Others agreed with this pessimistic 
verdict. Shareholders were described in the 1950s and 1960s as “an 
apathetic bunch”174 that played “no active role at all.”175 
It was hardly surprising that meaningful shareholder involvement in 
public company affairs was a rarity during the 1950s and 1960s. 
“Household” investors—primarily individuals buying and selling 
securities for their own personal account—collectively owned most of the 
shares in publicly traded companies (Figure 1).176 Such private (“retail”) 
investors, caustically labelled in 1967 “20 Million Careless Capitalists,”177 
typically lack the aptitude, resources, and firm-specific information 
needed to intervene productively in corporate affairs.178 They have little 
incentive to step forward in any case, given the hassle involved and given 
that the typical private investor owns a tiny stake and thus will only benefit 
trivially, in comparison to shareholders generally, from any share price 
increase associated with a successful intervention.179 
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Figure 1: U.S. Corporate Stock Held by Households and 
Institutions, 1945–1995 
 
Source: O’Sullivan (2000), OECD (1996)180 
 
While retail investors dominated share ownership throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, institutional investors were growing in importance 
(Figure 1). There were suggestions then that with institutional ownership 
increasing a promising source of managerial discipline was emerging. 
John Kenneth Galbraith, in a review of Adolf Berle’s 1959 Power Without 
Property, identified the accumulation of shares by institutional investors 
as “the one looming threat to the autonomy of the professional 
managers.”181 The Christian Science Monitor maintained in 1966 that 
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“[t]he growing share of institutional shareholders in stock ownership has 
raised the possibility of making corporate democracy more real.”182 
The institutional shareholders of the 1950s and 1960s, setting a 
pattern that would prevail over the next few decades, failed to step forward 
in the manner that seemed possible. In Power Without Property, Berle 
observed that there was “ample evidence” institutional shareholders “do 
not wish to use the voting power of the stock they have accumulated” and 
indicated, “When they seriously dislike the managements of corporations 
. . . their policy is to sell.”183 Non-intervention in turn served “to insulate 
the corporate managements.”184 A 1965 study of institutional shareholders 
concurred with Berle, characterizing them as “silent partners” and 
indicating, “For the most part, institutions are investors not controllers.”185 
The high-hopes-dashed pattern was repeated in the 1970s. Corporate 
law scholar Melvin Eisenberg, in his 1976 book The Structure of the 
Corporation, contrasted “concentrated institutional shareholders” with 
“highly dispersed individual shareholdings,” arguing that only the former 
gave “some hope of a check—a countervailing force—to management.”186 
Similarly, S.E.C. chairman Harold Williams said, as the 1970s drew to a 
close, that while “individual shareholder participation is not particularly 
effective,” “institutional shareholders have a part in vitalizing 
accountability.”187 
Institutional shareholders in fact were not much of a “countervailing 
force” during the 1970s. Edward McSweeney, a management consultant, 
observed in 1978 that “[s]o far, the managers of institutional funds have 
declined to interfere with management . . . preferring, like the ordinary 
stockholder, to sell when management fails to produce satisfactory 
earnings.”188 A 1979 Conference Board study of equity markets that drew 
heavily on a survey of senior executives confirmed the point, saying, “No 
study respondent expressed the view that institutions try to influence 
management.”189 
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Expectations regarding the contribution institutional shareholders 
could and would make in keeping public company executives in check 
stepped up a gear in the early 1990s. Share ownership patterns were part 
of the reason, with the proportion of shares retail investors owned having 
fallen to barely half (Figure 1). Also, hostile takeovers, which kept 
management on its toes during the 1980s amidst hectic deal-making, 
receded into the corporate governance background as the 1990s got 
underway.190 Institutional shareholders were identified as logical 
candidates to fill the governance gap.191 Furthermore, reforms were being 
undertaken to facilitate shareholder intervention. In 1992, the S.E.C. 
amended its rules governing parties who solicit proxies (lobby to vote on 
behalf of stockholders not voting in person at shareholder meetings) to 
give institutional shareholders scope to discuss privately investee 
companies without having to comply with potentially onerous proxy 
solicitation regulations, such as a requirement to file relevant 
documentation to obtain advance clearance by the Commission.192 
The rise of institutional investors was hailed regularly during the 
1990s as a major corporate governance phenomenon. In 1994, Forbes 
published a story, entitled Good-Bye to Berle & Means, that cited a 
handful of instances where institutional pressure contributed to the 
dismissal of chief executive officers (CEOs) of prominent public 
companies to make the point, “shareholders and boards of directors 
showed the boss who was boss.”193 Management professor Michael Useem 
suggested in 1996, “Institutional investors are the new high priests, the 
new repositories of wealth and power.”194 Richard Koppes, recently 
departed general counsel and number two executive at the California 
Public Employees Retirement System, a powerful public sector employee 
oriented (“public”) pension fund, argued in 1997 that “[n]othing has 
defined the revolution of corporate governance over the last 20 years as 
the rise of institutional investors.”195 
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Yet again, though, institutional shareholders flattered to deceive. The 
Financial Times observed in 1995, “Until now, shareholder activism in the 
U.S. has been a tepid affair.”196 Law professor Bernard Black, who had 
been optimistic about the potential for shareholder activism during the 
early 1990s,197 indicated in a 1998 survey of the topic, “The overall level 
of shareholder activism is quite low” and pointed out that “[e]ven the most 
active institutions spend less than half a basis point of assets (0.005%) 
under management on their governance efforts.”198 Economists Franklin 
Edwards and Glenn Hubbard, arguing in 2000 that institutional stock 
ownership was “a promise unfulfilled,” noted that “institutional investors 
on the whole have not taken an active role in corporate governance.”199 
The proportion of shares owned by households (i.e., retail investors) 
fell to 46% in 2000 and again to 36% in 2008.200 Moreover, the proportion 
of public companies that had at least one institutional shareholder owning 
10% or more of the shares had increased to 30% by 2008 from 12% in 
1980 and 20% in 1995.201 The bias in favor of passivity nevertheless 
continued in the 2000s. 
A 2005 analysis of corporate governance arrangements in Germany, 
Japan, France, Britain, and the United States said of the U.S., “Apart 
from . . . [public] pension funds . . . there are few signs of shareholder 
activism.”202 Law professor Steve Bainbridge observed similarly in 2010, 
“Today, institutional investor activism remains rare. It is principally the 
province of union and state and local public employee pension funds. But 
while these investors’ activities generate considerable press attention, they 
can hardly be said to have reunited ownership and control.”203 A key 
practical obstacle to a more robust approach to shareholder activism was 
that the investment managers with scope to interact with public company 
executives were typically seeking to maximize risk-adjusted investment 
returns so as to prevail in an ongoing competition to attract and retain 
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mandates to manage funds.204 With improved returns in a particular 
company most often having no more than a marginal impact on a 
diversified investment portfolio, with activism being time-consuming, 
costly, and not always successful, and with only a small fraction of any 
gains generated accruing to an enterprising investor who happened to step 
forward, the sums simply did not add up.205 
What did all of this signify for the Berle–Means corporation? For 
some observers, the dramatic growth in institutional shareholdings since 
the mid-twentieth century meant that the Berle and Means characterization 
of the corporate economy was intrinsically outmoded. For instance, in 
1993 Fortune drew attention to Berle and Means’s work, proclaiming 
“[t]hat era has ended” and quoted in support of that proposition the trustee 
of four New York City pension funds, who said of institutional investors, 
“We own the American economy now.”206 Law professor Robert 
Hamilton, referring to the growth of institutional shareholdings in a 2000 
article on corporate governance, said likewise: “Obviously, with such 
concentrations of voting power, the Berle and Means model of the publicly 
held corporation is no longer valid.”207 
The obsolescence of the Berle–Means corporation in fact was not as 
self-evident as Fortune and Hamilton suggested. The nomenclature Roe 
coined as the 1990s got underway was gaining traction just as the growth 
of institutional shareholders was supposedly rendering it passé. This was 
not inherently anomalous; the strong bias in favor of passivity on the part 
of most institutional shareholders likely meant that public company 
executives retained substantial discretion despite the shift toward 
institutional ownership. Indeed, the autonomy of top management was 
expansive enough to mean that by the end of the 1990s chief executives in 
large public firms were operating with sufficient swagger to be 
characterized as “imperial” CEOs.208 In 1991, law professor Jack Coffee, 
having acknowledged that “the Berle/Means public corporation” was “the 
dominant American organizational form,” elaborated on why it remained 
preeminent despite the substantial growth in institutional shareholdings: 
Yet if one looks only at the size of institutional holdings, one may 
commit the classic mistake of confusing an ox for a bull. Although 
public pension funds are ‘bulls’ who often engage in aggressive, 
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outspoken criticism of corporate management, they constitute only a 
modest minority of institutional investors. Most other institutional 
investors seem closer to ‘oxen,’ because they have shown little 
willingness to oppose corporate managements or even to support 
dissidents.209 
Drawing matters together, with respect to the interplay between the 
substantial growth of institutional shareholdings and the continued use of 
the Berle–Means corporation nomenclature, by the early 2000s a division 
of opinion had emerged. Some—such as Fortune and Robert Hamilton—
felt that the large-scale substitution of “careless capitalists” (i.e., retail 
investors) with institutional shareholders was sufficient to render the 
Berle–Means characterization of American corporate governance per se 
obsolete. With the Berle–Means corporation nomenclature gaining favor, 
however, the prevailing view was that the bias in favor of passivity 
affecting institutional shareholders meant ownership remained separate 
from control despite the growth in institutional holdings. We will consider 
next whether the position with institutional investors has changed 
sufficiently in recent years to displace this prevailing view and will see 
that this has not occurred. We will also find out that the emergence of a 
fresh source of shareholder pressure on management—activist hedge 
funds—has not eclipsed the Berle–Means corporation yet, and is unlikely 
to do so for the foreseeable future. 
VI. THE BERLE–MEANS CORPORATION TODAY—AND TOMORROW 
We have just seen that while various observers were saying “Good-
bye to Berle & Means” during the 1990s the Berle–Means corporation 
survived as a popular moniker for the American public company, even if 
the nomenclature had begun “to show some wear.”210 Switching to the 
present day, a common refrain is that the Berle and Means characterization 
of ownership and control in U.S. public companies is “now wrong.”211 
What might have changed in the meantime to seal the fate of the Berle–
Means corporation? One possibility, a now supposedly dominant 
collective stake of the largest institutional shareholders, has already been 
identified briefly.212 Other candidates are the emergence of activism by 
hedge funds and the growing prominence of index tracking funds. We will 
consider each in turn. None, in fact, are major difference makers with 
respect to the inter-relationship between ownership, control, and 
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managerial discretion, meaning the Berle–Means corporation 
nomenclature remains apt. 
A. Concentrated Institutional Ownership 
One point those who have recently been hailing the demise of the 
Berle–Means corporation make is that the collective stake of the largest 
institutional shareholders has now become so sizeable that the concept’s 
fate must be sealed. For instance, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst, having 
posited “the prospects for stewardship by shareholders are substantially 
better today than in Berle–Means corporations,” support their claim by 
citing share ownership data for 2016 for the 20 largest U.S. corporations 
lacking a controlling shareholder.213 They report that, on average, the 5 
largest institutional shareholders owned 21% of the shares, the largest 20 
owned 33%, and the largest 50 owned 44%.214 Gilson and Gordon 
concluded, on the basis of similar data they collected for 2009 for the 10 
biggest U.S. companies, that “representatives of institutions that 
collectively represent effective control of many large U.S. corporations 
could fit around a boardroom table.”215 
Undertakers for the Berle–Means corporation appear to be assuming 
that collective institutional stakes of the sort currently prevailing in the 
largest U.S. public companies will translate readily into substantial 
compromising of managerial discretion. This can by no means be taken 
for granted, as research on British institutional investors indicates. In the 
mid-1990s, Bernard Black and Jack Coffee examined levels of 
institutional shareholder activism in the United Kingdom to gauge the 
prospects for activism in the United States, citing the fact that there were 
fewer barriers to intervention in Britain.216 One such consideration was the 
prevalence of sizeable institutional stakes. According to Black and Coffee, 
it was typical for the 25 largest institutional shareholders to hold a majority 
of the stock of a U.K. public company,217 a higher ownership concentration 
than Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst cite for large U.S. public companies 
today. Nevertheless, a separation of ownership and control remained a 
hallmark of corporate Britain. Black and Coffee acknowledged there was 
not “the complete passivity announced by Berle and Means” but 
emphasized “the reluctance of even large shareholders to intervene.”218 
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The bias in favor of passivity that prevailed among powerful 
institutional shareholders in 1990s corporate Britain is paralleled today in 
the United States. Gilson and Gordon acknowledge that while theoretically 
the substantial collective stakes held by major institutional shareholders in 
U.S. public companies “should mitigate the managerial agency cost 
problems of the Berle–Means corporation[,] . . . [r]eality has fallen 
short.”219 Gilson and Gordon say of the possibility of U.S. institutional 
investors acting as “real” owners or “stewards,” “institutions have 
continually failed to play this role; despite the urging of academics and 
regulators, they remain stubbornly responsive but not proactive.”220 
Other observers concur. John Bogle, founder of the giant mutual fund 
group Vanguard, cited in 2005 the potentially “awesome power” of 
institutional investors and referred to the largest institutional holders as 
“the King Kong of investment America.”221 He conceded in 2012 that “the 
strong voice I expected to hear is barely a whisper.”222 Investment bankers 
Joseph Perella and Peter Weinberg wrote in the New York Times in 2014, 
“[T]he big shareholders, the institutional shareholders who invest for 
pension funds and the like, need to stop being silent and speak out.”223 The 
Economist said in 2015 of major American asset managers, “[T]heir 
business is running diversified portfolios and they would rather sell their 
shares in a struggling firm than face the hassle of fixing it.”224 
The bias against activism amongst institutional investors is 
evidenced by the fact that even the largest asset managers acting on behalf 
of mutual funds and pension funds have for the hundreds of corporations 
in which they invest only a small department dedicated to shareholder 
voting and other governance-related stewardship activities.225 Modest 
staffing reflects, as the Financial Times said of the situation in the U.S. in 
2015, “the Cinderella status of governance within fund management 
businesses. While trumpeted as important, it is not an area on which 
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institutions have historically lavished pay and investment.”226 With a small 
governance contingent in place, it should be feasible for major asset 
managers to make reasoned decisions whether to back firm-specific 
proposals that activist shareholders periodically make. These asset 
managers can also realistically adopt a voting stance opposing generic 
management-friendly governance mechanisms, such as “staggered” 
boards, where only a designated proportion of directors stand for election 
each year, and “plurality” voting, where an unopposed board nominee 
need not obtain a majority of votes cast to be elected.227 Shareholders, 
however, almost never exercise rights they might have to veto transactions 
executives propose.228 More generally, taking a sufficiently close interest 
in a particular company to offer detailed guidance on strategy or spearhead 
a public activism campaign will be off the agenda.229 
Mutual funds and pension funds do pretty much always vote their 
shares, due in large part to a strong steer to do so from the S.E.C. and 
Department of Labor rules.230 The level of engagement with the issues, 
however, is decidedly modest. To manage the costs associated with the 
potentially daunting number of resolutions on which public companies ask 
their shareholders to vote—250,000 per year by one count—asset 
managers rely heavily on advice they pay to receive from proxy advisors 
such as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis.231 Jamie 
Dimon, CEO of megabank JPMorgan Chase, has accused investment 
managers of being “lazy capitalists” due to the farming out of voting 
decisions to these advisory services.232 The extent to which fund managers 
adopt proxy adviser recommendations differs depending on the 
circumstances, but departures from what is prescribed are uncommon.233 
Justin Fox, a financial journalist, and Jay Lorsch, a Harvard Business 
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School expert on corporate governance, have said of the result, “It’s better 
than nothing, which is what most individual investors do, but it’s a 
standardized and usually superficial sort of oversight.”234 
If, despite substantial collective holdings, large institutional 
shareholders are not compromising markedly managerial autonomy, why 
might it be that, as Gilson and Gordon and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Hirst 
posit, that the Berle–Means corporation is passé? According to Gilson and 
Gordon, what has emerged is a regime of “agency capitalism” where 
institutional shareholders, as agents for end investors, are “not ‘rationally 
apathetic’ . . . but instead are ‘rationally reticent.’”235 With respect to the 
discretion available to executives running public companies, this could 
well be a distinction without a difference. Unless institutional shareholders 
begin conducting themselves in the manner that would be expected of 
“real” owners, the managerial accountability challenges that characterize 
the Berle–Means corporation will remain live issues despite substantial 
and quite concentrated institutional ownership. Correspondingly, absent 
concrete evidence of shareholders regularly taking meaningful steps to 
keep management in check, the term “Berle–Means corporation” remains 
appropriate short-hand for the paradigmatic American public company. 
We will consider next whether hedge funds that specialize in shareholder 
activism might be changing the game. 
B. Hedge Fund Activism 
We have just seen that, from the rise of the Berle–Means corporation 
through to the present day, “mainstream” institutional investors have 
forsaken stepping forward in the manner that those who are optimistic 
about institutional shareholder involvement in corporate governance have 
envisaged. In the 2000s, however, a subset of hedge funds—lightly 
regulated collective investment vehicles marketed to sophisticated 
investors—began launching with some frequency campaigns to pressure 
public company executives to engage in shareholder-friendly change.236 
The typical tactic was to build up quietly a sizeable, but by no means 
dominant, holding in a suitable target and then agitate for change. 
Common demands included that management return cash to shareholders 
by way of a stock buyback or a one-off dividend payment, sell weak 
divisions to improve the bottom line, and even put the company itself up 
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for sale.237 Hedge fund interventions were sufficiently prominent to be 
characterized as “the newest big thing in corporate governance” in the 
2000s.238 
The turmoil associated with the 2008 financial crisis posed 
challenges for hedge fund activists, but activism continued, albeit without 
quite the same intensity as during the mid-2000s.239 Hedge fund activism 
then went into overdrive as the 2010s got underway. Jack Coffee and 
financial economist Darius Palia said in 2016 that hedge fund 
interventions had “recently spiked, almost hyperbolically.”240 
The efforts of hedge funds play an important part in Ronald Gilson 
and Jeff Gordon’s claim that the Berle–Means corporation has been 
relegated to a historical curiosity. Having acknowledged that mainstream 
institutional shareholders fail to act like “real owners” despite substantial 
collective ownership, they hail hedge fund activists as “governance 
intermediaries” who identify underperforming firms and put forward 
concrete proposals for changes intended to improve shareholder returns.241 
As Gilson and Gordon point out, mainstream institutional investors are 
often favorably disposed toward such initiatives, and institutional backing 
in its turn frequently represents sufficient voting power to swing around 
otherwise recalcitrant executives of targeted companies.242 This “happy 
complementarity” generates, according to Gilson and Gordon, effective 
shareholder-related governance unknown to the Berle–Means 
corporation.243 
Gilson and Gordon likely overestimate the transformative effect of 
activist hedge funds on shareholder–management relations. For instance, 
hedge fund interventions are something of a rarity in the case of big public 
companies. With very large prospective targets, typically too many eggs 
have to be put in one investment basket for it to be worthwhile for a hedge 
fund to buy up a minority stake sufficiently sizeable to capture 
management’s attention and to yield meaningful profits in the event of 
success.244 
The New York Post did warn in 2013 that “no company is safe as 
corporate cage rattlers take aim at some of the biggest names in 
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business.”245 Two years later, the Economist provided readers with 
examples, saying “Americans encounter firms that activists have targeted 
when they brush their teeth (Procter & Gamble), answer their phone 
(Apple), log in to their computer (Microsoft, Yahoo and eBay), dine out 
(Burger King and PepsiCo) and watch television (Netflix).”246 Such 
interventions are, however, aberrations. According to FactSet, a financial 
data company, in 2016, among 319 “high impact” activist interventions 
(those where a shareholder activist sought to obtain board representation, 
dismiss top executives, or otherwise campaigned strongly to bolster 
shareholder value) affecting U.S. public companies, only 5% involved a 
target with a market capitalization exceeding $10 billion.247 Ten billion 
dollars may sound like a large number, but as of mid-2018, among the 
largest 100 companies in the S&P 500 stock market index, the smallest 
company’s market capitalization was $32.1 billion.248 Correspondingly, 
while activist hedge funds are significant corporate governance 
intermediaries, their activities are insufficient in isolation to displace with 
any sort of regularity the reticence (or apathy) among shareholders that 
would be expected in a large public company. 
Hedge fund activism may also have reached an inflection point 
marking the end of the upward trajectory that began in the 2000s.249 Public 
company executives, realizing they can end up on the back foot once a 
hedge fund activist arrives, are increasingly taking advance precautions. 
Reputedly, “‘think like an activist’ has become a boardroom mantra as 
companies strive to anticipate potential hedge fund demands and address 
perceived weaknesses.”250 Numerous companies have, for instance, begun 
engaging in activist “fire drills,” identifying areas of vulnerability, and 
making changes so as to try to forestall a hedge fund foray.251 With public 
companies reading the activism playbook and taking anticipatory 
measures, hedge funds seem to be pulling back as they realize there are 
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fewer instances where intervening will add value.252 The number of 
activist forays indeed declined substantially in 2016 and 2017 as compared 
to 2014 and 2015, including among large public companies.253 
Data for the first few months of 2018 suggest the decline in hedge 
fund interventions may have ended, at least temporarily.254 However, 
another emerging trend should preclude a meaningful enduring surge in 
hedge fund activism if it persists. Activist hedge funds have been, on 
average, generating poor returns lately.255 Perhaps with public company 
executives endeavoring to think like activists, there are now few instances 
where underperformance is sufficiently egregious for intervention to yield 
bumper returns. Whatever the explanation, investors, disappointed with 
results activist hedge funds have been delivering, have begun taking their 
money out of the sector, a trend that inevitably would throw the brakes on 
activist hedge fund growth if it continues in earnest.256 Hedge fund 
activism thus appears to be stalling, even if there is no full-scale retreat on 
the horizon. This means that, if hedge fund activists have not already dealt 
the fatal blow to the Berle–Means corporation, they are unlikely to do so 
in the foreseeable future. 
C. Index Trackers 
Whatever the position turns out to be with hedge funds, we need to 
take into account a recent plot twist with mainstream institutional 
shareholders. Dramatic growth in the popularity of “passive” index 
tracking funds has resulted in fears of “a concentration of ownership not 
seen since the days of the Rockefeller Trust” oriented around Standard Oil 
at the turn of the twentieth century.257 Perhaps this “re-concentration of 
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corporate ownership” is “a fundamental reorganization of the system of 
corporate governance”258 that could yet spell doom for the Berle–Means 
corporation. 
From an investor perspective, index tracking funds have much to 
recommend them. Big tracker funds drive down fees by exploiting 
economies of scale and by deploying a plain-vanilla investment approach, 
namely matching the performance of a stock market index such as the S&P 
500.259 For instance, the expense ratio for the main S&P tracker fund that 
the Vanguard Group operates is 0.04% of the fund’s assets, as compared 
with 0.8% for the average actively managed American mutual fund.260 If 
actively managed funds outperformed the market, the higher fees would 
be good value. However, they usually do not. Passive funds typically 
deliver superior returns over time, even discounting the fee advantage a 
plain-vanilla tracking strategy provides.261 
The logic of index tracking funds has proved persuasive. In 2016, of 
the more than $400 billion of new retail investments coming through 
financial advisers, 82% were placed in index funds and their close relative, 
exchange trading funds.262 With the money pouring in, the proportion of 
the S&P 500 owned by U.S.-based index trackers increased from 4.6% in 
2005 to 13.9% in 2017.263 
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, the three largest U.S.-based 
asset management firms, dominate the rapidly growing index tracking 
industry.264 With a substantial majority of the assets under management of 
each of the “Big Three” invested in passive index funds,265 the dramatic 
growth of index tracking funds has meant their stakes in public companies 
have increased substantially recently. Vanguard’s passive funds alone held 
a stake of 5% or more in 468 S&P 500 companies as of 2016, up from just 
3 companies in 2005.266 The proportion of S&P 500 companies where 
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BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street combined would constitute the 
largest shareholder increased from 25% in 2000 to 88% in 2015.267 
The large collective stake the Big Three hold in U.S. public 
companies has been referred to as “[a]n economic blockbuster” that “has 
recently been exposed.”268 In particular, the anti-competitive effects of 
“common ownership,” which exists where a single investor owns shares 
of competing firms, have set off alarm bells.269 An investor in this position 
will potentially prefer that the co-owned corporations refrain from 
competing intensely so as to create scope for charging higher prices that 
will bolster profits and shareholder returns.270 With the Big Three having 
ostensibly emerged as “the dominant capital market players of our 
time,”271 concerns exist that their collective common ownership is 
substantial enough to influence the behavior of market leaders in key 
industries and create substantial anti-competitive effects throughout the 
U.S. economy.272 
Regardless of who the shareholders might be, executives running 
firms that dominate an industry with oligopolistic features have incentives 
to throw the competitive brakes on so as to avoid difficult decisions and 
enjoy a “quiet life.”273 The manner in which the Big Three operate 
indicates that they are unlikely to do much, if anything, to reinforce 
whatever tendencies already exist for rivals in an industry to ease off 
competitively.274 With respect to the governance of public companies, any 
highly diversified investment fund will have a bias in favor of passivity. 
Intervening may not yield a beneficial outcome, the benefits arising from 
successful interventions must be shared amongst all shareholders, and the 
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expense and distractions associated with stepping forward could result in 
losing out in terms of relative performance to less-energetic, free-riding 
rivals.275 Index tracker funds have particularly weak incentives to act as 
engaged shareholders.276 Operators of index funds do not compete over the 
performance of the index they are set up to mimic, which is taken as a 
given, and instead focus on keeping costs as low as possible and 
eliminating tracking errors.277 Correspondingly, if those running an index 
fund expend resources to identify and correct underperformance in 
particular companies, any gains will be shared with the market at large, 
fees will likely increase and, in an industry where price competition has a 
significant effect on investor inflows, market share could well be lost 
rapidly to cheaper, fully passive rivals.278 
Operators of index tracking funds insist they are not mere 
“professional snoozers.”279 Larry Fink, BlackRock’s CEO, who reputedly 
wants “to be the conscience of Corporate America,”280 maintains that 
“[t]he time has come for a new model of shareholder engagement—one 
that strengthens and deepens communication between shareholders and 
the companies that they own.”281 Similarly, Vanguard Principal and Fund 
Controller Glenn Booraem has said its funds seek to be “passive investors 
but active owners.”282 Booraem reasons that Vanguard and other 
investment firms operating index tracking funds must exercise their voices 
because, with the level of investment in companies being pre-determined 
by the market, “[w]e’re riding in a car we can’t get out of” and 
“[g]overnance is the seat belt and air bag.”283 Fear of criticism provides an 
additional incentive to speak up. A State Street official has said, “We are 
stewards of a large part of the U.S. economy, and it’s important that we do 
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that properly. If we didn’t do that, we’d open ourselves up to opprobrium 
from our investors.”284 
The Big Three have added staff recently to deal with governance and 
stewardship.285 Nevertheless, each of the firms is poorly situated to 
impinge substantially on the discretion of public company executives, 
whether to encourage those executives to throw the competitive brakes on 
or otherwise. BlackRock’s governance team is comprised of around 35 
employees tasked with overseeing the 14,000 companies in which 
BlackRock owns shares.286 Vanguard has just over 20 people for its 13,000 
companies and State Street has approximately a dozen for its 9,000.287 The 
Big Three’s governance staffers carry out dozens of engagements each 
year with management of companies in which their index tracking funds 
own shares.288 Nevertheless, with most portfolio companies it is not 
feasible to arrange a meeting even annually.289 Public company executives 
notice. A CEO told the Financial Times in 2017, “We’d love to talk to the 
passive guys, they control 20% of our shares, but they don’t want to see 
us.”290 
Given the modest amount of direct contact between the Big Three 
indexers and public companies in which they own shares, anything 
approaching the sort of firm-specific meddling in which activist hedge 
funds engage is unrealistic. BlackRock’s head of corporate governance has 
acknowledged that “[i]t’s not the shareholders’ role to second guess what 
management is doing in every single issue.”291 The largest passive 
investors do throw their weight around sometimes.292 For instance, votes 
against board nominees companies put forward occur with some 
regularity.293 Critics nevertheless charge index trackers with failing to 
devote any more attention to the voting process than is required to satisfy 
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regulators “or perhaps to satisfy their own conscience and boost their 
firm’s image.”294 Whatever their attentiveness level, most often leading 
passive investors back management.295 In 2017, BlackRock supported 
management’s stance 91% of the time, State Street did so with 86% of 
resolutions, and Vanguard’s support level was 94%.296 The Financial 
Times has said of this pattern that it signals “a degree of inattention at odds 
with dynamic stewardship claims.”297 
Voting patterns on executive pay confirm the tendency among the 
largest passive investors to support management. Under the Dodd Frank 
Act of 2010, a “say on pay” scheme was introduced, giving shareholders 
of publicly traded companies the right to vote on executive pay policy on 
an advisory basis at least once every three years.298 When shareholders 
have the opportunity to vote, they rarely oppose the approach being taken. 
From 2011 through 2017, with corporations in the Russell 3000 stock 
market index, the company lost outright only 1.9% of time.299 In the case 
of S&P 500 companies, shareholder support levels for management on say 
on pay resolutions were 91% in 2016 and 92% in 2017.300 BlackRock and 
Vanguard have been particularly strong backers. During 2016, each voted 
98% in favor of pay practices at S&P 500 companies.301 The New York 
Times has said of BlackRock’s voting power on executive pay that its “big 
stick is more like a wet noodle.”302 
Executive pay has increased noticeably since say on pay’s 
introduction, with the median pay of S&P 500 CEOs rising from just under 
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$9 million in 2010 to $11.6 million in 2017.303 This trend, combined with 
strong shareholder support for policies upon which they have been asked 
to vote, has prompted harsh verdicts on the say on pay experiment, such 
as “tinkering at the edges at best,”304 “a bust,”305 and “ineffective.”306 Say 
on pay has nevertheless not been a corporate governance irrelevance.307 
As the Wall Street Journal noted in 2014, even though the votes are 
nonbinding, “most corporate boards consider a negative vote a black eye 
and work hard to respond to shareholder concerns.”308 The say on pay 
process has correspondingly prompted many companies to increase board 
outreach to shareholders, accompanied by the opening of new lines of 
communication.309 Boards in their turn have been prepared to make 
modifications to head off dissent, which likely has bolstered the high 
approval rates that have been obtained.310 Although BlackRock rarely 
votes against management on executive pay, the fact that compensation is 
a key topic for discussion with nearly half of the engagements BlackRock 
has with public companies lends credence to this conjecture.311 
The say on pay regime, where public companies listen to their 
shareholders but retain considerable scope to proceed in the manner they 
see fit, reflects broader trends concerning mainstream institutional 
investors. Rav Gupta, a former CEO of a Fortune 500 chemical concern 
and an outside director of additional Fortune 500 companies, was likely 
correct when he suggested in 2016 that, due primarily to large institutional 
intermediaries, “shareholders are exerting a more effective and powerful 
influence on corporate management than in the past.”312 On the other hand, 
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there remains a continued bias against engagement that means public 
company executives have wide discretion to run their firms without 
provoking active pushback.313 For instance, Jeffery Immelt managed to 
remain chief executive of American corporate icon General Electric for 
sixteen years despite the corporation’s share price never being higher than 
it was in 2001, the year he was appointed.314 Correspondingly, despite 
institutional shareholders owning a large proportion of shares in public 
companies and despite the substantial collective stake of the biggest 
institutions, there remains a separation of ownership and control in public 
firms not very far removed from the Berle and Means’s 1930s version. 
Assuming the popularity of index tracking funds continues to grow, 
the trend likely will reinforce the institutional bias against activism despite 
their collective ownership stake growing in size. Only time will tell exactly 
what corporate governance role BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street 
will assume.315 Given the business model underpinning index tracking 
funds, however, it is unlikely that the voting power available to passive 
indexers will substantially compromise existing managerial prerogatives 
in the foreseeable future. Concrete, sustained evidence of shareholders 
taking meaningful, proactive steps to keep management in check would 
mean that it would no longer be appropriate to refer to the paradigmatic 
American public company as the Berle–Means corporation. That evidence 
is currently lacking and, despite the attention index tracking funds have 
garnered, likely will be for some time yet. 
CONCLUSION 
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously declared in 1932 that 
America’s largest corporations were characterized by a separation of 
ownership and control. Their call on this was somewhat premature. Even 
among the largest companies at the start of the 1930s, only a minority 
lacked a shareholder that owned a sufficiently large stake to exercise 
meaningful influence. Nevertheless, Berle and Means would set the tone 
for debates about public company governance for decades to come. 
Having documented that many public companies lacked large 
shareholders, including amongst the executive cohort, Berle and Means 
mused in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, “[I]f all profits 
are earmarked for the security holder, where is the inducement for those 
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in control to manage the enterprise efficiently?”316 They also asked their 
readers, “[H]ave we any justification for assuming that those in control of 
a modern corporation will also choose to operate it in the interests of their 
owners?”317 It would soon become the norm for large U.S. corporations to 
lack stockholders with ownership stakes sufficiently substantial to create 
the incentive to monitor executives closely and to provide the voting clout 
needed to exercise meaningful influence. Given, as Berle and Means 
indicated, the potential for abuse of managerial discretion where share 
ownership is diffuse, the separation of ownership and control was destined 
to become what Mark Roe described in 2005 as “the core fissure” in 
American corporate governance.318 
The “Berle–Means corporation,” the term Roe coined in the early 
1990s as shorthand for the large public company where ownership is 
divorced from control, was the locale for the core governance fissure he 
identified. Ironically, at the time Roe developed the Berle–Means 
corporation nomenclature, its position at the center of the American 
corporate governance firmament was under threat in a manner 
unprecedented since a separation of ownership and control became the 
norm in large U.S. firms in the 1940s and 1950s. The 1990s was a period 
when institutional investors became sufficiently prevalent as stockholders 
to prompt suggestions that share ownership in public companies had 
coalesced in a way that made the Berle–Means characterization of the 
large firm passé. In addition, a prevailing assumption that a separation of 
ownership and control in big companies was the product of basic business 
logic was displaced. By arguing in the early 1990s that the dominance of 
the Berle–Means corporation was at least partly a product of political 
context, Roe began to upend the received wisdom and launched a still 
continuing debate on determinants of ownership structure in large firms. 
We have now moved on nearly thirty years since the Berle–Means 
corporation entered the corporate governance lexicon and since challenges 
to its conceptual dominance began occurring in earnest. The 
appropriateness of invoking Berle and Means to characterize ownership 
and control arrangements in larger American public companies remains 
contested. This is not because shareholders with sufficiently large 
ownership stakes to be both inclined to and capable of exercising dominant 
influence over management have moved (or more accurately returned) to 
the forefront in large American public companies. Instead, hedge fund 
activism and collective institutional stakes sufficiently large to mean that 
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investment intermediaries representing close to a majority of outstanding 
shares could sit around a boardroom table are ostensibly prompting the 
Berle–Means corporation’s demise. 
It in fact is premature to write the obituary for the Berle–Means 
corporation. Hedge funds are significant corporate governance 
intermediaries, but challenges to very large firms remain rare and hedge 
fund activism may well have peaked after a lengthy surge. As for 
“mainstream” institutional shareholders, departures from the hands-off 
approach to governance associated with the Berle–Means corporation 
have been modest overall, with these investors showing little inclination 
to engage in meaningful stockholder-oriented stewardship. With index-
tracking funds, given their business model, continued growth in their 
ownership stake seems likely to fortify the institutional investor bias in 
favor of passivity rather than hasten the arrival of “real” owners in large 
American public companies. The upshot is that, despite the wear and tear 
the Berle–Means corporation has suffered in recent decades, it has yet to 
fall by the wayside and seems unlikely to do so for the foreseeable future. 
